A discussion of the separation of church and state.
Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society (2013). This paper sets out the case for abolishing state-recognised marriage and replacing it with piecemeal regulation of personal relationships. It starts by analysing feminist objections to traditional marriage, and argues that the various feminist critiques can best be reconciled and answered by the abolition of state-recognised marriage. The paper then considers the ideal form of state regulation of personal relationships. Contra other recent proposals equality and liberty are not best served by the creation of a new holistic status, such as civil union, or by leaving regulation to private contracts. Instead, the state should develop piecemeal regulations that apply universally. You can read the paper and listen to the podcast here or on the OUP Philosophy Festival Reading List here.
My piece “Liberal views” discusses different models of separation of church and state, as they are conceptualised philosophically and as they apply to actual polities. The article is here.
I participated in this excellent event at the University of Birmingham. Details here.
The seminars take place on Fridays between 1.00-2.30pm in the Coleridge Room, Jesus College. All are welcome.
Christian List, LSE: Theory Construction in Political Theory: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective
Sarah Fine, King’s College, London: Migration and Distributive Justice
Moya Loyd, Loughborough University: Deaths That Matter: Critical Reflections on the Politics of Mourning and the Limits of Human Belonging
Matt Kramer, University of Cambridge: Torture, Morality, and Law
I presented my paper “The Marriage-Free State” to the Aristotelian Society on 7 January 2013. While the Aristotelian Society may not be outside academia I’ve put it here because there’s a podcast! You can listen to the podcast of the presentation here.
The seminars will take place on Fridays between 1.00-2.30pm in the Coleridge Room, Jesus College. All are welcome.
Convenors: Dr Clare Chambers (Philosophy) and Dr David Blunt (POLIS)
Jules Holroyd, University of Nottingham: Moral and Institutional Desert
Ben Colburn, University of Glasgow: Beneficence and Blackmail
Alex Voorhoeve, LSE: How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?
Catriona McKinnon, University of Reading: Crimes Against Humanity, and Future People
The Andrea Dworkin Commemorative Conference was held at the Centre for the Study of Social Justice (CSSJ), University of Oxford, in 2006. You can hear the podcasts of the day here, with thanks to the CSSJ for allowing them to be posted.
Michael Moorcock, “Andrea Dworkin’s fiction”
Julie Bindel, “Myths about Andrea Dworkin”
John Stoltenberg, “What Andrea knew about her work”
Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Going Her Own Way”
I made a live appearance on BBC Radio 4’s Woman’s Hour, discussing ideas from Sex, Culture, and Justice in the context of a debate on cosmetic surgery and the concept of ‘normal’, on 31st July 2012. You can listen to the debate right here via the sound file below. The segment begins at 33m, I am on at 37m.
Edited excerpt from Sex, Culture, and Justice published by UK Feminista as their first Thinkpiece on “Cosmetic Surgery, Culture, and Choice”. Find it here.
My work was cited in Fabiana, the magazine of the Fabian Society Women’s Network, issue 2 p. 7 (Winter 2012). Print and on-line, on-line available here.
My chapter on “Feminism” from the Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies was cited in Rahila Gupta, “Has neoliberalism knocked feminism sideways?” 4th January 2012. Available here.
I was a keynote speaker at this IPPR event, held on 1 December 2011. Audience members included MPs, ministers, think tanks, pressure groups, journalists. Details here.
My Philosophy Bites podcast on “Liberalism and Intervention”, an interview with Nigel Warburton produced by David Edmonds, is part of the special series “Multiculturalism Bites”, available here.
I supervise students on the MPhil in Philosophy and the PhD in Philosophy, both at the Faculty of Philosophy. Admissions decisions for MPhils and PhDs are made by the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Philosophy, so I cannot make any offer of supervision directly to a student. Please visit the Faculty website for details of how to apply.
Prospective graduate students should note that admission to the MPhil is usually conditional on previous specialisation in Philosophy. PhD students are normally admitted to the MPhil in the first instance. Applicants with a Masters degree from elsewhere may be considered for direct admission to the PhD but, again, evidence of previous specialisation in Philosophy is required.
The Political Philosophy Workshop is open to graduate students and above, from all Faculties. It discusses work in progress by doctoral students and above, usually those based in Cambridge. Papers are pre-circulated and there is no presentation, so all participants must join the mailing list and read the papers in advance. To join the mailing list email me at cec66 <at> cam.ac.uk
The Seminar in Contemporary Political Thought is held on alternate Fridays in Michaelmas and Lent Terms. Please see the “Events” page of this website for more details. The Research Seminar is aimed at graduate level and above, but undergraduates are also welcome.
Clare Chambers and Phil Parvin (Hodder & Stoughton, 2012)
Written by two leading experts, this book can help you whether you are studying for an important exam or simply want to improve your knowledge.
The first half of the book introduces the reader to the essential concepts within political philosophy, such as freedom, equality, power, democracy, rights, and the state.
The second half of the book looks at how influential political philosophers, such as Plato, Rawls and Mill, have used these fundamental concepts in order to tackle a range of normative political questions such as whether the state has a responsibility to alleviate inequalities, and what role liberal and democratic states should play in regulating the cultural or religious beliefs of citizens.
(Dr Daniel Butt, Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Bristol)
‘A lively, accessible and engaging read. Comprehensive and well organized, it provides an updated account of key concepts in contemporary political philosophy, and highlights their relevance to political life in the 21st century. A valuable book for anyone taking their first steps in the world of political philosophy, or anyone who seeks to understand the normative challenges faced by our society today.’
(Dr Avia Pasternak, Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Essex)
‘Written in a clear and accessible style, it is an engaging introduction for those who are new to political philosophy and wish to think through some of its most important questions. In addition to offering outlines of key arguments, each chapter also contains a summary of main concepts, self-test questions, a wonderful selection of quotations and some attention-grabbing ‘nuggets”
(Dr Zosia Stemplowska, University Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Oxford)
In Section 50 of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, titled “The Family as a Basic Institution”, John Rawls replies to Susan Moller Okin’s feminist critique of A Theory of Justice. The question of how Rawlsian justice might secure gender equality has been discussed by many feminists, most notably by Okin. However, as I argue in this chapter, the Rawls-Okin debate raises more questions than it answers. Okin criticises Rawls for failing to apply his theory adequately to the family: she criticises not Rawls’s approach in general, but his attitude to the family in particular. Okin argues that a consistent application of Rawlsian theory would secure gender justice, but that Rawls is remiss in refusing such consistency. In fact, as I show, Rawls’s remarks on the family reveal a more fundamental problem with Rawlsian theory than Okin allows. It is not that Rawls fails to apply his theory correctly to the family, but rather that the specific case of the family illustrates deep-seated difficulties with Rawlsian justice as a whole.
The problem, to give an outline, is that Rawls’s ambiguous remarks on the family are comprehensible only at the expense of his fundamental claim that there is something distinctive about the application of justice to the basic structure. Okin criticises Rawls for failing to make good on the fact that the family is part of the basic structure. If he did make good, Okin claims, he would see that the principles of justice must apply to the family in a much more extensive way than he actually allows. As I show, however, the family is one illustration of the fact that how the principles of justice apply to an institution does not depend on whether that institution is part of the basic structure. This is a problem for Rawls because the distinctiveness of the basic structure is a crucial part of the political liberalism which, by the end of his work, has become essential to the Rawlsian project.
In this chapter I first outline Okin’s critique of Rawls in more detail, and provide a valid formalisation of her argument against Rawls. I then examine the main premises of her argument and look for evidence to support Okin’s interpretation of Rawls. I conclude that Okin’s interpretation is flawed but nonetheless highlights problems with Rawls’s claim that the basic structure is the subject of justice. I then consider and reject the argument that Rawls’s theory is consistent according to what I call the “whole structure view”: that the principles of justice apply to the basic structure considered as a whole. Finally, I consider G.A. Cohen’s argument that the basic structure distinction is problematic. I agree with Cohen’s criticism of the distinction, but suggest that Cohen is wrong in situating the problem with the issue of coercion. I conclude that Rawls’s position on justice in the family is at odds with his claim that the basic structure is uniquely the subject of justice.
You can see more about the book here.
This chapter sets out the state of contemporary feminism, including considering the sense in which it is and is not an ideology. It argues that contemporary feminism must argue against two patriarchal claims: The Prison of Biology and The Fetishism of Choice. In their place, feminism argues for three theses: The Entrenchment of Gender, The Existence of Patriarchy, and The Need for Change.
You can read the chapter here.
This paper claims that a focus on gender as a source of controversy, and on feminism as a theoretical and practical approach, prompts a rethinking of the role of dialogue away from the liberal constitutionalist focus of deliberative democracy and towards a more fluid, reflexive approach.
This paper introduces the concept of a Moment of Equal Opportunity (MEO): a point in an individual’s life at which equal opportunity must be applied and after which it need not. The concept of equal opportunity takes many forms, and not all employ an MEO. However, the more egalitarian a theory of equal opportunity is, the more likely it is to use an MEO. The paper discusses various theories of equal opportunity and argues that those that employ an MEO are problematic. Unjust inequalities, those that motivate the use of equal opportunity, occur throughout peoples’ lives and thus go unrectified after an MEO. However, it is not possible to abandon the MEO approach and apply more egalitarian versions of equal opportunity throughout a person’s life since doing so entails problems of epistemology, efficiency, incentives and counter-intuitive results. The paper thus argues that liberal egalitarian theories of equality of opportunity are inconsistent if they support an MEO and unrealisable if they do not.
You can read this paper here.
(with Phil Parvin) in Matt Matravers and Lukas Meyer (eds.), Democracy, Equality, and Justice (Routledge and special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP) Vol. 13 No. 1 (2010).
In this article, we evaluate the capacity of liberal egalitarianism to rebut what we call the libertarian challenge of charity. This challenge states that coercive redistributive taxation is neither needed nor justified, since those who endorse redistribution can give charitably, and those who do not endorse redistribution cannot justifiably be coerced. We argue that contemporary developments in liberal political thought render liberalism more vulnerable to this libertarian challenge.
Many liberals have, in recent years, sought to recast liberalism such that it is more hospitable to cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. This move has resulted in increased support for the claim that liberalism should be understood as a political rather than comprehensive doctrine, and that liberal institutions should draw their legitimacy from agreements made among members of an appropriately conceived deliberative community, rather than from controversial liberal principles like individual autonomy. We argue that, while this move may indeed make liberalism more compatible with cultural diversity, it also makes it more vulnerable to the libertarian challenge of charity. Not all versions of liberalism are troubled by the challenge, but those that are troubled by it are increasingly dominant.
We also discuss G.A. Cohen’s claim that liberal equality requires an ‘egalitarian ethos’ and argue that, if Cohen is right, it is difficult to see how there can be an adequate response to the libertarian challenge of charity. In general, our argument can be summarised as follows: the more that liberalism is concerned accurately to model the actual democratic wishes and motivations of the people it governs, the less it is able to justify coercively imposing redistributive principles of justice.
You can read a copy of this paper here.
This article responds to Alan Brudner’s Constitutional Goods. It argues that Brudner’s concept of liberal inclusivity is problematic both conceptually and normatively, and results in policies on marriage and abortion that liberals would not accept. Issue No. 2 includes a response from Brudner.
(Penn State University Press, 2008)
Autonomy is fundamental to liberalism. But autonomous individuals often choose to do things that harm themselves or undermine their equality. In particular, women often choose to participate in practices of sexual inequality-cosmetic surgery, gendered patterns of work and childcare, makeup, restrictive clothing, or the sexual subordination required by membership in certain religious groups. In this book, Clare Chambers argues that this predicament poses a fundamental challenge to many existing liberal and multicultural theories that dominate contemporary political philosophy. Chambers argues that a theory of justice cannot ignore the influence of culture and the role it plays in shaping choices. If cultures shape choices, it is problematic to use those choices as the measure of the justice of the culture. Drawing upon feminist critiques of gender inequality and poststructuralist theories of social construction, she argues that we should accept some of the multicultural claims about the importance of culture in shaping our actions and identities, but that we should reach the opposite normative conclusion to that of multiculturalists and many liberals. Rather than using the idea of social construction to justify cultural respect or protection, we should use it to ground a critical stance toward cultural norms. The book presents radical proposals for state action to promote sexual and cultural justice.
“[A]n interesting, important, wide-ranging and well-argued book that contains a controversial proposal that will, no doubt, be widely debated.”
—Times Higher Education
“[A]n important book. … Very few first-rate analytical thinkers … engage with social theorists: Chambers is a notable exception, and if only for that reason, her contribution should serve as a model for any endeavour of this kind. … Moreover, its strength lies not merely in the author’s mastery of two disparate intellectual traditions, but also in its cogent and provocative defence of a number of proposals.“
“[E]xtremely successful. … Testament to her scholarly rigour, Chambers skilfully avoids alienating either side of the academic divide [between analytical and continental philosophy]; achieving her stated aim, she undermines the foundations upon which such divides are rooted. … This opportune and tightly argued work reveals the extent to which equality and justice cannot be guaranteed by a political liberalism which venerates autonomy to the exclusion of other important values. Setting itself apart from other work in its field, this book forms, albeit on its own terms, part of the solution.”
“Chambers’ work makes a highly valuable contribution to contemporary philosophical debates. … Chambers’ work represents a great advance in attempting to forge a path between two positions which are so often considered to be diametrically opposed. The project … is a vital one. … [T]he value of the theoretical contribution, both to liberal and feminist philosophy, is indisputable.”
“Her interwoven arguments … are complex, meticulous and inventive. … [T]here is real potential here for this book to alter mainstream liberal thinking.”
“An incisive, well-written book with a sustained, original argument.”
—Ruth Abbey, University of Notre Dame
“The book contributes significantly to the literature of liberalism, autonomy, and feminism.”
—Ann Cudd, University of Kansas
“Chambers’ refreshing approach has the potential to expand the scope of conventional liberal theory by showing how liberals can (and should) directly meet the challenge of postmodern approaches and by demonstrating that feminist contributions are the well from which most innovations in liberalism are drawn.”
—Avigail Eisenberg, University of Victoria
Catriona McKinnon (ed.) Issues in Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008, 2nd edition 2011).
This textbook from OUP introduces the key issues and themes in political theory
through chapters and case studies written by a variety of international political philosophers. My chapter on gender discusses issues such as the varieties of feminism, the family and care, sex and violence, legal equality, and has a special case study on pornography.